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Abstract: The World Health Organization claimed recently that improving patient adherence 
to long term therapies would be more beneﬁ  cial than any biomedical progress. First, however, 
we must understand its mechanisms. In this paper I propose a novel approach using concepts 
elaborated in a ﬁ  eld rarely explored in medicine, the philosophy of mind. While conventional 
psychological models (eg, the Health Belief Model) provide explanations and predictions which 
have only a statistical value, the philosophical assumption that mental states (eg, beliefs) are 
causally efﬁ  cient (mental causation) can provide the basis for a causal theory of health behaviors. 
This paper shows that nonadherence to long term therapies can be described as the medical 
expression of a philosophical concept, that is, weakness of will. I use philosophical explanations 
of this concept to suggest a mechanistic explanation of nonadherence. I propose that it results 
from the failure of two principles of rationality. First, a principle of continence, described by 
the philosopher Donald Davidson in his explanation of weakness of will. This principle exhorts 
us to act after having considered all available arguments and according to which option we 
consider best. However, patients conforming to this principle of continence should rationally 
be nonadherent. Indeed, when patients face a choice between adherence and nonadherence, 
they must decide, in general, between a large, but delayed reward (eg, health) and a small, but 
immediate reward (eg, smoking a cigarette). According to concepts elaborated by George Ainslie 
and Jon Elster, the force of our desires is strongly inﬂ  uenced by the proximity of reward. This 
inter-temporal choice theory on one hand, and the mere principle of continence on the other, 
should therefore lead to nonadherence. Nevertheless, adherence to long term therapies is pos-
sible, as a result of the intervention of an additional principle, the principle of foresight, which 
tells us to give priority to mental states oriented towards the future.
Keywords: patient adherence, chronic diseases, weakness of will, inter-temporal choice, prin-
ciple of foresight, causal theory of health behaviors, philosophy of mind
The lack of concordance between patients’ behavior and prescribed therapy is described 
in the medical literature as patient noncompliance (Sackett 1979) or nonadherence 
(Lutfey 1999). This phenomenon concerns all the pathologies. Typically, the disease 
prone to the phenomenon of nonadherence is chronic disease, remaining silent until a 
complication occurs. The patient does not understand its severity, its treatment neces-
sitates a number of medications and interventions to change life style (diet, exercise, 
smoking habits) and is more preventive than curative (Meichenbaum and Turck 1987a). 
Nonadherence is considered to be a major issue in contemporary medicine. Indeed 
the World Health Organization (WHO), in a recent report entitled “Adherence to long 
term therapies, time for action”, claimed that solving this problem would be more 
beneﬁ  cial than any biomedical discovery (WHO 2003).Patient Preferences and Adherence 2008:2 8
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This paper aims to investigate the mechanism of 
nonadherence: I will argue that patient nonadherence rep-
resents, together with manifestations like drug addiction, 
gambling, spending sprees, procrastination and the like, a 
manifestation of what philosophers have called weakness of 
will, where people seem to act against their best judgment. In 
other words, patient nonadherence shares with these behav-
iors a common mechanism, which can be used to deﬁ  ne a 
general concept encompassing them all. In medical terms, 
weakness of will is a syndrome and patient nonadherence to 
long term therapies represents its medical manifestation.
The puzzling aspect of medical 
nonadherence evokes the concept 
of weakness of will
Nonadherence concerns all aspects of therapy: not only 
taking medicines, but also following recommendations on 
life-style changes such as diet and physical exercise, avoiding 
high-risk behaviors, such as the use of tobacco or alcohol, 
or simply returning for the next medical appointment. For 
instance, in diabetes care, a review of the literature revealed 
that about two thirds of patients followed advice on diet, but 
only 25% of patients followed advice on exercise, and only 
7% of patients were found to follow all recommendations 
(McNabb 1997). Considering speciﬁ  cally medication, the 
rate of adherence varied according to the studies from 60% 
to 85%. Furthermore, only 16% to 80% of patients were 
found to persist with their treatment over a period of 6 to 24 
months (Cramer 2004). One year after a heart transplant, the 
rate of nonadherence to immunosuppressive drug prescription 
ranged from 20% to 25% (Dew 1996).
This last observation is puzzling, because such patient 
behavior is extremely harmful to personal health, and this 
is not just a matter of physician opinion. This paradoxical 
aspect of nonadherence evokes the phenomenon of weakness 
of will, or incontinent actions, or akrasia (literally without 
strength): between two actions a and b, the akratic individual 
performs b, while her reason would exhort her to perform 
a. This paradox has puzzled philosophers since Aristotle 
(Aristotle, Nic Eth). They had to explain how weakness 
of will is possible (Davidson 1980a), which is typically a 
philosophical question, since “philosophers are interested 
in the conceptual line that separates the possible from the 
impossible. They ask how certain phenomena, including 
mental phenomena, can exist” (Pears 1998). Such ques-
tions justify the philosophical approach proposed herein to 
explain how nonadherence is possible. Furthermore, I will 
provide the evidence that adherence itself also appears to be 
paradoxical. Thus, explaining how adherence is possible is 
the main aim of this paper.
Nonadherence to treatment, 
a bunched phenomenon
As shown above, nonadherence presents a continuum, from 
rare patients entirely adherent to medical prescriptions, to 
patients who are completely nonadherent. Philosophers have 
pointed out that weakness of will is “regional” as well. Thus, 
as noted by Alfred Mele (1987), someone who exhibits a 
great deal of self-control in professional life may be quite 
weak-willed about eating or smoking. Nevertheless, differ-
ent aspects of therapeutic nonadherence have often been 
observed simultaneously in a given patient. For example, 
diabetic patients who smoke are less adherent to recom-
mendations concerning blood glucose monitoring and exer-
cise, and skip more medical appointments than nonsmokers 
(Solberg 2004). In contrast, nonsmokers may readily accept 
a complex treatment (Perros 1998) and patients who monitor 
their blood glucose frequently also devote more time to car-
ing for their feet, to their diet, or to exercise (Safford 2005). 
Similarly, a recent study showed that in a cohort of more than 
20,000 users of statin, adherent patients were more likely to 
undergo prostate-speciﬁ  c antigen tests, fecal occult blood 
tests, screening mammograms, and to receive inﬂ  uenza or 
pneumococcal vaccinations during a 1-year ascertainment 
observation period (Brookhart 2007). Furthermore, a recent 
meta-analysis of 21 clinical trials showed that patients who 
were adherent to placebo had lower rates of mortality than 
other patients in the placebo arm, who were less adherent 
(Simpson 2006). This ﬁ  nding can be understood if one 
assumes that nonadherent patients not only did not take their 
medication, but had other harmful lifestyle habits.
Taken together, these data may suggest a typology con-
cerning the fact of being adherent or nonadherent to therapy, 
which may be explained in part by extrinsic factors: nonad-
herence to medical recommendations is frequently observed, 
as shown above, in smokers, but also in those who live alone 
(Toljamo 2001), who are depressed (Ciechanowski 2000) or 
socially deprived (Self 2005). I will propose another hypoth-
esis, however: these manifestations are bunched under the 
denomination of nonadherence because they share a common 
mechanism, involving weakness of will.
Patient nonadherence and weakness 
of will
Interestingly, this explanation of their behavior is often 
spontaneously given by patients, maybe because the concept Patient Preferences and Adherence 2008:2 9
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of will is strongly anchored in folk psychology. The word 
willpower is often used by lay people. On the difﬁ  culty of 
long term dieting and its consequence, obesity, a Spanish 
study (Lopez-Azpiazu 1999) showed that the three reasons 
most often given for an unhealthy diet were lack of willpower 
(30%), irregular work schedules (30%), and the unattractive 
appearance of the recommended food (21%). Some obese 
patients ask for a gastric band as a mechanical support for 
their weak will: “It will force me to follow my diet.” Simi-
larly, the two reasons most often given by Canadian women 
(Olmsted 2004) to explain why they do not exercise when 
they know it would be good for their health, are also lack of 
time (40% of answers) and lack of willpower (also 40% of 
answers). An English study on more than 10,000 subjects 
showed that those who suggested internal type barriers (I am 
too busy, I lack willpower, I am lazy) rather than external bar-
riers (transport is too long, I have no money) are signiﬁ  cantly 
less physically active (Ziebland 1998).
Equating patient nonadherence to therapies with weak-
ness of will (Reach 2000) represents a paradigm shift in the 
analysis of this problem: that is, a switch from a conception 
of nonadherence from the physician’s point of view (nonad-
herence is classically deﬁ  ned as the absence of concordance 
between patient behavior and medical recommendations) to a 
conception in which only the patient’s rationale is considered. 
In the next section, I will describe the current philosophi-
cal explanations for weakness of will, and try to determine 
whether they are relevant to the speciﬁ  c issue of nonadher-
ence to long term therapy.
Patient nonadherence as a case of 
weakness of will: which mechanism?
Inter-temporal choice
This ﬁ  rst explanation, proposed by George Ainslie (1985) 
and Jon Elster (1999), can be demonstrated by the following 
scenario (Figure 1). I am entering a restaurant with a strong 
resolution to follow my diet. The value of the reward linked 
to this resolution (my health) is by that time more important 
than the value I give to the dessert I see on the menu. How-
ever, by the end of the dinner, the value given to the dessert 
suddenly increases, and becomes higher than the value I give 
to my desire to remain lean. This change is a result of the 
hyperbolic nature of the function describing the effect of time 
discounting (Ainslie 1985). At that time of the dinner, I am 
not irrational if I ﬁ  nally decide to order the dessert.
Time discounting, ie, the bowing of the curves shown in 
Figure 1 and, therefore, the risk of preference reversal, are 
more or less marked depending on the individuals: people 
are more or less impatient, having a more or less important 
time discounting rate. Impatience may represent a heritage 
from our ancestors, when it was advantageous to be impa-
tient (Elster 1986). The degree of impatience may have a 
neurophysiological, or even genetic basis (Manuck 2003). 
Furthermore it may be modiﬁ  ed by exogenous factors, the 
rate of depreciation of the future increasing for example 
under the inﬂ  uence of social deprivation or of depression 
(Feldman 2002), or simply under the inﬂ  uence of alcohol, a 
phenomenon known as alcohol myopia (Steele and Josephs 
1990).
In this way the nonadherent patient may well be the patient 
who is by nature impatient, preferring the immediate reward 
of nonadherence (smoking, the extra-piece of cake, rest) to 
the delayed reward of adherence, avoiding the long term 
complications of the disease. This common mechanism may 
explain why in a given individual, different manifestations 
of the weakness of will, including nonadherence to therapy, 
are bunched. The inter-temporal choice explanation of patient 
nonadherence is therefore appealing. It must be stressed, how-
ever, that while strong relationships between health behavior 
and measures of time preference can be found in addiction 
(Bickel 2003), a number of studies reviewed by Gretchen 
Chapman which examined other kinds of health behavior, 
found a weak or nonexistent relationship to time preference. 
For instance, one study examined two measures of adherence 
to hypertension treatment: pharmacy records of prescription 
reﬁ  lls and medical appointments kept. Neither measure was 
related to a hypothetical-choice measure of discount rate. As 
discussed by Chapman, this failure to relate health behavior to 
time preference may be due to the fact that both hypothetical 
choices and health behaviors reﬂ  ect time preferences, but that 
time preferences vary sufﬁ  ciently from situation to situation, 
so that the two are not related. Alternatively, some classes 
of behavior, like smoking, may reﬂ  ect time preference, but 
not others, like health behaviors (Chapman 2003). It remains 
therefore to explain why smoking and other harmful health 
behaviors are bunched in a number of patients.
The principle of continence 
and the partition of mind hypothesis
A second kind of explanation was given by the philosopher 
Donald Davidson, who offered two successive accounts of 
the weakness of will (Davidson 1980a, 1982). First he evoked 
the existence of a principle of rationality, which describes the 
coherence of our actions. This principle of continence exhorts 
us, when we have the choice between two possible actions, 
to consider all the available arguments, and to act, all things Patient Preferences and Adherence 2008:2 10
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considered, according to our estimate of what is best for us: 
“the phrase ‘all things considered’ must, of course, refer only 
to things known, believed, or held by the agent, the sum of his 
relevant principles, opinions, attitudes, and desires” (Davidson 
1980a). Thus, “incontinent” (weak-willed) action is due to a 
failure of this principle. The application of this conception of 
weakness of will to nonadherence is illustrated in Figure 2.
This explanation is insufﬁ  cient, however, because it does 
not explain how a principle of rationality can be “exiled” 
from practical reasoning. Let’s suppose that the choice 
between action “a” and action “b” in Figure 2 is between 
nonsmoking and smoking a cigarette. The patient considers 
all the arguments and her best judgment tells her that she 
should refrain from smoking. If she exercised her principle 
of continence, she would refuse the cigarette. However, she 
takes it. One may suppose that her desire to smoke caused 
the “exile” of her principle of continence. Here, Davidson 
stumbled on a difﬁ  culty: this argument assumes that a mental 
state (a desire) causes a mental event (the exile of a principle 
of rationality) without being a reason for this event. This 
phenomenon contradicts his own causal theory of action, 
published in a seminal paper “Actions, reasons and causes” 
(1963), which demonstrated that the reason for an action is 
its cause (Davidson 1980b). In order to solve the paradox of 
the incontinent action, it became necessary to explain how 
a desire can cause a mental event without being its reason: 
“There is a mental cause which is not a reason for what it 
causes” (Davidson 1982).
Indeed, this can happen when cause and effect occur in 
different minds. In his essay “Paradoxes of irrationality”, 
Davidson gave the following example:
“Wishing to have you enter my garden, I grow a beautiful 
ﬂ  ower there. You crave a look at my ﬂ  ower and enter my 
garden. My desire caused your craving and action, but my 
desire was not a reason for your craving, nor a reason on 
which you acted. (Perhaps you did not even know about 
my wish). Mental phenomena may cause other mental 
phenomena without being reasons for them, then, and still 
keep their character as mental, provided cause and effect 
are adequately segregated” (Davidson 1982).
Force of desire Smaller-Sooner
(SS)
The tempting cake
Larger-Later
(LL)
Health
Preference 
reversal
The dinner time
t1 t2
Figure 1 Preference reversal.
Because of the hyperbolic nature of the curves describing time discounting of a small and a large reward, the curves cross over (preference reversal).   At time t1, the large 
reward seems more important than the small, immediate reward.   At t2, taking the small, immediate, reward is rational.   According to George Ainslie:
“a hyperbolic discounter who faces a choice between smaller-sooner (SS) and larger-later (LL) rewards will evaluate them roughly in proportion to their objective 
size – their values at zero delay – when both are distant, but value the SS reward disproportionately when it is close. Thus she will have an innate tendency to form 
temporary preferences for SS rewards, purely as a function of elapsing time”. (Ainslie 2005).Patient Preferences and Adherence 2008:2 11
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This led Davidson to appeal to a Freudian idea, that of a 
partitioned mind:
“I went on to explain the vague and confusing notion of 
an attitude or principle being ignored or suppressed by 
appealing to a Freudian idea, that of a partially partitioned 
mind. The idea, as I employed it, meant that attitudes in the 
same mind could be kept from actively interacting, so that 
the agent remained to some extent protected from the clash 
that would result from facing unwelcome thoughts or their 
consequences” (Davidson 1999).
Although he presented this partition of the mind as a 
“Freudian idea”, Davidson pointed out that this partition 
is not necessarily between the conscious and unconscious 
domains:
“The standard case of akrasia, or incontinent action is one in 
which the agent knows what he is doing, and why, and knows 
that it is not for the best and knows why. He acknowledges 
his own irrationality” (Davidson 1982).
Any clinician will recognize a number of clinical obser-
vations. When we tell a patient about an obvious occasion 
when we think she should have adjusted her insulin dose 
(for instance, her glycemia was very high every morning 
during the last two weeks), and when we ask her why she 
did not do it, either she cannot answer the question, or her 
explanation applies only to one element of the debate. For 
example, she might say she is afraid of hypoglycemia, or 
afraid of gaining weight, or she has had a lot of problems 
lately and was too preoccupied to take care of her diabetes 
(Reach 2005a). The other element, the plea to adjust the 
insulin doses, seems to have disappeared from the practical 
reasoning, although the patient is conscious of it: what is 
irrational is this disappearance. Some pipe smokers remove 
the packet labels that warn of tobacco’s dangerous effects. 
Although such action is irrational, in this way they can avoid 
‘considering’ such issues.
However, applying this conception to health behavior is 
problematic, too. As Olav Gjelsvik pointed out, Davidson’s 
concept allows for causal/irrational deviations from what is 
considered best, all things considered. In theory, there is no 
reason to expect any particular pattern in these causal/irra-
tional deviations, which might favor a long-term perspective 
or a short-term one (Gjelsvik 1999). If we consider the two 
opposing actions of accepting or refusing a cigarette, we 
can see that the desires which would cause the action of 
smoking are largely present-oriented, while those causing 
the refusal of the cigarette are concerned with the future. 
The theory of time discounting described above indicates 
that the force of a desire depends on the temporal proxim-
ity of its reward. Therefore, the incontinent desire should 
be stronger, and the principle of continence should exhort 
us, rationally, to be nonadherent. An additional principle is 
therefore necessary to give the advantage to those arguments 
linked to the future.
Figure 2 Weakness of will as a failure of Davidson’s principle of continence, and its application to patient nonadherence.
The philosophy of action has, since Aristotle and Hume, proposed that our actions are driven by an attitude based on a desire and the belief that this particular action belongs 
to the actions which will contribute to granting this wish. Beliefs and desires can be driven by emotions that are triggered by outside events. Knowledge and skills have an 
instrumental role: they contribute to the formation of beliefs, or are involved in the accomplishment of the action. Nonintentional states, like pain, also belong to what Davidson 
calls “all things considered”. When an agent must decide between two actions, she uses a “principle of continence”, which exhorts her to consider all the available arguments, and 
to carry out the action that, all things considered, she has estimated to be the best for her.   Thus, “incontinent” (weak-willed) action is due to a failure of this principle. Nonadherence 
to long term therapies can be considered as a choice between (a) performing a therapeutic action (eg, measuring blood glucose to adjust insulin dose) and (b) not performing 
this action, which can itself be considered as an “action” having its own reasons.
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Why are people adherent 
to therapies in chronic disease? 
The need for an additional principle
This analysis leads me to propose a hypothesis in which 
adherence would require using an additional principle, 
referred to as a principle of foresight, which would give 
priority to motivations that are directed toward the future, 
rather than immediate rewards (Figure 3). In the absence of 
such a principle, the patient would be nonadherent because 
the principle of continence would place priority on the pres-
ent (Figure 3A). What we (the patient’s doctor or relatives) 
would consider irrational, according to our own principles 
of continence and foresight, and what we would qualify as 
nonadherence, would be, from the patient’s point of view, 
completely rational (Reach 2007).
One may speculate that the differentiation of such a prin-
ciple of foresight arises slowly in adulthood, leading to an 
age of foresight, where for example, we contract health and 
life insurance. In fact, the principle of continence may also 
appear slowly. Davidson quoted “St. Augustine’s extraordi-
nary prayer: ‘give me chastity and continence, only not yet’ 
(Confessions, VIII, vii)”.
If one wants to take a reductionist view, it is tempting to 
speculate that this hypothesis may have a neurophysiological 
basis. Some mental states could in some way be tagged as 
“present-relevant” or “future-relevant”. Such labels would be 
neurophysiologically removed by alcohol, which explains the 
phenomenon of “alcoholic myopia”, or by some neurome-
diators released under the effect of emotion, which explains 
the role of emotions in triggering weakness of will (Tappolet 
2003), in our case, nonadherence to therapies.
Clinical implications 
of the hypothesis
First, from a heuristic point of view, the hypothesis presented 
here is consistent with some obvious clinical observations. For 
example, the remarkable therapeutic adherence which arises 
at the time of pregnancy, well known by diabetologists (Rug-
giero 1990) and physicians taking care of VIH-infected patients 
(Vaz 2007), but also the therapeutic nonadherence observed 
so often in those who are socially deprived (Feldman 2002). 
In the minds of these latter patients, who do not know what 
tomorrow will look like, the future-related domain is empty. It 
may be the same for adolescents, among whom adherence to 
therapy is often poor: they live in the present or even consider 
themselves immortal, which is the same. Signiﬁ  cantly, a recent 
paper showed that adherence to therapies by adolescents and 
young adults, while undergoing heart transplants, is linked to 
the patient’s maturity (Stilley 2006).
Secondly, and more practically, helping the patient to 
develop a principle of foresight may represent a major goal 
in the trust-based patient-physician relationship. In this 
way the patient may become adherent, by sharing her views 
with her doctor about the beneﬁ  ts of the treatment, and also 
by accepting the long term gains of adopting a principle 
of foresight. Discussing with the patient her approach to 
the concept of time may therefore represent an important 
part of the educational diagnosis. Incidentally, it has been 
suggested that in general physicians may have a lower 
discounting rate, and are more concerned about the future 
than patients (Feldman 2002). When dealing with patients 
who apparently are not (or not yet) interested in the future, 
the search for intermediary rewards may represent a well 
known alternative, rather than proposing unrealistic long-
term objectives: “The goals must be realistic or potentially 
achievable. The inclusion of subgoals that have a high 
likelihood of success increases adherence by both patients 
and HCPs” (Meichenbaum and Turk 1987b). Thus the 
conceptual framework proposed herein may pave the way 
toward the design of speciﬁ  c and testable interventions aimed 
at improving patient adherence.
Different avatars of the principle 
of foresight
In this paper, I have proposed a mechanism to explain the 
“nonadherence syndrome”, which involves two principles: 
Davidson’s principle of continence, which exhorts us to act 
only after having “all well considered”, and the additional 
principle of foresight, which tells us to give priority to the 
future. Behaving according to these principles would help to 
protect our health. The principle of foresight may have dif-
ferent avatars: a low discounting rate, as in the inter-temporal 
choice theory, self-control, as in Gary Watson’s and Alfred 
Mele’s explanations of the weakness of will (Watson 1977, 
Mele 1987), will-power, as in Roy Baumeister’s account, or 
Richard Holton’s strength of will (Baumeister 2003, Holton 
2003).
A ﬁ  nal avatar of the principle of foresight may be self-love, 
which is for the philosopher Harry Frankfurt the purest form 
of love and, indeed, the most authoritative form of caring. In 
his essay, “The importance of what we care about” (Frankfurt 
1988), Frankfurt suggested that “the outlook of a person 
who cares about something is inherently prospective; that is, 
he necessarily considers himself as having a future”. In his Patient Preferences and Adherence 2008:2 13
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Figure 3 The principle of continence (A) and the principle of foresight (B).
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recent book The Reasons of Love, he gives an interpretation of 
self-love, which appears directly relevant to our discussion:
“It may happen that a person loves something, ﬁ  nds it 
important, and, at the same time, does not want to love it. 
If the ambivalence cannot be resolved by a decisive iden-
tiﬁ  cation with one side of the conﬂ  ict, the person’s mind 
is fragmented. Ambivalence is a disease, and the health of 
mind demands a uniﬁ  ed will. To have an undivided will is 
to be wholehearted. And, in turn, to be wholehearted is to 
love one-self” (Frankfurt 2004).
I propose that this construct can help us to understand 
one of the meanings of patient adherence. Thus, nonadherent 
patients are unable to decide between the long term reward 
of health and some immediate pleasure; their mind is “frag-
mented”; in contrast, adherent patients who take care of their 
health refuse the fatality of long-term complications; using 
their principle of foresight, their will is now undivided; their 
future is important to them and they are whole-heartedly will-
ing to preserve it. According to a frankfurtian account of the 
phenomenon, I suggest that they do it because, in fact, they 
love themselves. The relationship between this philosophical 
concept of self-love and the more classical, psychological, 
construct of self-esteem deserves further consideration.
The play by the French dramatist Eugène Ionesco, Exit 
the King (1962) describes the behavior of King Bérenger 
when he learns that he will die at the end of the play. He 
refuses to do so. At the very end, he cries: I love myself! Let 
us propose that, as the everyman, he would like to keep tak-
ing care of himself, and that if a treatment was proposed to 
him, he would be a perfectly adherent patient.
A top-down model of adherence
In his Breakdown of Will, George Ainslie suggests that an 
impatient individual may serve her long term interests by obey-
ing a personal rule (Ainslie 2001). Here, her current choice 
(for instance refusing the dessert at the end of the dinner) will 
to some extent include the bundle of future rewards that this 
choice predicts. That is, the current choice, today, of a larger, 
later reward (eg, her health) over a smaller, more immediate 
reward (eg, this piece of cake), if perceived as a test case, could 
possibly predict a whole bundle of larger, later rewards in the 
future, and thus be valued more than it would be by itself. 
Ainslie elegantly demonstrated that this mental mechanism 
transforms hyperbolic curves into exponential-like curves 
which cannot cross each-other (Figure 4, from Ainslie 2005). 
Hyperbolic curves lead to the danger of preference reversal 
(at the end of the dinner, I order the dessert), but this is not 
possible with exponential curves. It is important to point out 
that such a personal rule applies only to a speciﬁ  c behavior 
(ie,refraining from smoking). Of course, the patient may form 
different personal rules for different behaviors. I suggest that 
she may do this by using the principle of foresight.
A speciﬁ  c aim of this paper was to provide a mechanistic 
explanation of a clinical observation: different manifestations 
of nonadherence are often “bunched” in a given patient, who 
is inﬂ  uenced by the principle of foresight. However, there is 
a difference between this effect of the principle of foresight, 
which results in the bunching in the same patient of differ-
ent aspects of adherence, and the solution of bundling larger 
rewards according to a personal rule, which Ainslie found 
increases their value. In the ﬁ  rst case, several distinct tasks 
of therapy are connected (Figure 5). Interestingly, in Holton’s 
account, will-power is described as a general faculty, which 
enables one “to abide by all of one’s resolutions: resolutions 
not to drink, not to smoke, to eat well, to exercise, to work 
hard, not to watch daytime television, or whatever” (Holton 
2003). We arrive therefore at a “top-down” conception of 
adherence, in which principles of rationality represent the 
mechanistic basis of adherence. This idea is consistent with 
the clinical observation that different nonadherent manifesta-
tions are often present in the same patient.
A pathophysiological approach: 
principles of rationality as devices
The hypothesis presented here relies on two principles of 
rationality to explain how one can, in the long term, be 
adherent to medical therapies, namely Davidson’s principle 
of continence, and the principle of foresight. One may argue 
that principles are actually nothing but ad hoc explanations, 
which do not explain anything. This argument can be defeated 
if one follows Robert Nozick’s reasoning that principles are 
devices, whose function is to help us avoid random decisions 
(Nozick 1993). Similarly, in the natural world, the function 
of enzymes is to make it possible that a given biochemical 
reaction is oriented in a speciﬁ  c direction. Indeed, although 
reasons are causes of actions (Davidson 1980b), there are no 
psychological laws, as in the natural world, where a reason A 
leads always to an effect B. In a “physiology of mind”, A may 
lead to B or C, where C can be the opposite of B: alcohol-
ism in the parents may cause alcoholism or sobriety in the 
children (Elster 2003). Thus, principles may be understood 
as necessary “teleological” devices of human logic.
Therefore those who are not adherent to medical therapies 
are those who do not have the principles that allow them to be 
adherent. This conclusion may seem to be circular. However, 
it is not more circular than the statement that insulin is the Patient Preferences and Adherence 2008:2 15
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hormone which prevents the development of a diabetic state. 
Indeed, it is compatible with the fact that in medicine, as shown 
by the French philosopher Georges Canguilhem, pathology 
always precedes physiology: the understanding of the adrenal 
function had to wait for the observation that some people have 
an adrenal insufﬁ  ciency and the description of its symptoms by 
Thomas Addison (Canguilhem 1991). Accordingly, observing 
patients’ refusal to take their medication, to exercise, to follow 
a particular diet and the like, is the ﬁ  rst step which helps us to 
understand how adherence to medical therapies is possible. 
Once the mechanism of adherence is understood, one is in a 
better position to strengthen it, if necessary.
Psychological and philosophical 
accounts of nonadherence
In this paper, I have proposed a philosophical account of 
nonadherence to long term therapies. In the psychological 
literature, several models have been proposed to aid our 
understanding of how a health behavior can be changed. 
These models are a product of psychology, sometimes called 
the science of behavior, and more speciﬁ  cally of one of its 
relatively new ﬁ  elds, the psychology of health. Rigorous 
empirical research must demonstrate statistically signiﬁ  cant 
correlations between the supposed determinants, and the 
health behavior. The ﬁ  rst model, the Health Belief Model, 
showed the importance of beliefs in the adoption of a health 
behavior (Becker 1975). The notion of motivation, in the form 
of the concept of intention, was introduced by the Theory of 
Reasoned Action (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) and the Theory 
of Planned Behavior (Ajzen 1985). The Theory of Interper-
sonal Behavior (Triandis 1979) introduced the role played 
by habit. The Self-Regulatory Model showed that a subject’s 
self-evaluation of behavior creates a situation of feedback, 
which manifests itself not only at the cognitive, but also at 
the emotional level (Leventhal 1997). The Health Locus of 
Control (Wallston 1978) and the Sociocognitive Theories 
(Bandura 1991) highlighted the psychological notion 
of self-efﬁ  cacy. The Transtheoretical Model of Change 
(Prochaska 1983) has to be set apart, however. It attempts 
to explain the adoption of a health behavior as a dynamic 
process, concerned not so much with what leads the subject 
to a change in behavior, but rather with how to describe the 
stages of the change.
No one of these models incorporates the concept of 
weakness of will – which is surprising, given that failure to 
diet or to refrain from smoking are routinely used by phi-
losophers as examples of paradigmatic cases of weakness 
of will, and that patients themselves point to their lack of 
willpower to explain why they do not follow recommen-
dations, at least concerning diet and exercise. A possible 
explanation is historical. Most of these psychological models 
were published during the years 1970 to 1980, before, or 
during, the period when the concept of weakness of will was 
revisited by philosophers. For example, Donald Davidson’s 
classic paper, “How is weakness of will possible?” (Davidson 
1980a) was ﬁ  rst published in 1970, papers on weakness of 
will and akrasia by Gary Watson and by Amelie Rorty were 
published in the late 1970s (Watson 1977, Rorty 1980), and 
Alfred Mele published his book on akrasia in 1987. Simi-
larly, the concepts of inter-temporal choice and of multiple 
self, which are used to explain the weakness of will, derive 
from George Ainslie’s ﬁ  rst experimental works in the early 
1970s (Ainslie 1974) and were mainly popularized in “The 
Multiple Self”, edited by Jon Elster in 1986 (Elster 1986), and 
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Figure 4 George Ainslie’s personal rules.
“If the person makes a whole series of choices at once – for instance a class of choices united by a principle – the curve describing her valuation of the LL 
rewards will be much higher: Principled choice boosts LL reward values only when discount curves are hyperbolic or otherwise deeply bowed. Such curves 
from a series of paired SS and LL rewards may come never to cross (b), with the same amounts that cause curves from a single pair to cross (a, = last pair in 
b).” (Ainslie 2005).Patient Preferences and Adherence 2008:2 16
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in his “Picoeconomics” published in 1992 (Ainslie 1992), 
the year when the ﬁ  rst textbook on inter-temporal choice, 
“Choice Over Time”, was edited by Jon Elster and George 
Loewenstein (1992).
Actually, it would be fair to recognize that these various 
psychological models, proposed to explain how one adopts 
a health behavior, do not explicitly refer to the concept of 
will, or its weakness, but some make clear the importance 
of constructs, which may be related, such as intention or 
self-efﬁ  cacy. Thus, in the Theories of Reasoned Action 
and Planned Behavior, the likelihood of adopting a health 
behavior is closely associated with the intention expressed by 
the patient. In these models, the patient’s intention to perform 
a health behavior is a construct combining her attitude toward 
performing the behavior and subjective norms, represented 
by beliefs, concerning the way the behavior is perceived by 
persons who may be import to her.
Similarly, in the Transtheoretical Model described by 
James Prochaska, neither will nor intention is explicitly 
mentioned. However, I have shown elsewhere that we can 
interpret this model philosophically (Reach 2005b), and 
recognize the step from pre-contemplation to contemplation, 
to the formation by the individual of an intention, and the step 
from contemplation to preparation, to the patient’s decision 
to adopt a health behavior. In the same way, the maintenance 
phase of the Prochaska model may require from the patient 
what Richard Holton calls a resolution, that is, a special 
form of intention, used to defeat contrary inclinations that 
may emerge. But, according to Holton, the agents must have 
a strong will – that is, strength of will, which is the contrary 
to the weakness of will – to be able “to stick by their reso-
lutions even in the face of strong contrary desires; agents 
whose willpower is weak readily abandon their resolutions” 
(Holton 2003).
Therefore, if patient nonadherence has not been for-
mally related to the concept of weakness of will in these 
health psychological models, this may simply be connected 
with its pure philosophical nature. Although psychologists 
who elaborated these models used other words to describe 
the motor of behaviors, implicitly, they also used either 
a simple humean desire-belief account (Hume 1740), or 
an augmented humean account, including intention, as 
proposed by the philosopher Michael Bratman (Bratman 
1999).
Figure 5 A top-down model of adherence to therapies in chronic diseases.
In this model, the patient may be adherent to a given recommendation (eg, refraining from smoking, fastening seatbelt, exercising) by applying to each speciﬁ  c task the tactic 
of a personal rule. George Ainslie suggests that this tactic consists in considering the current choice of the larger, later reward over a smaller, sooner reward (see Figure 1), 
as a test case which predicts a whole bundle of larger, later rewards in the future (bundling tactic) described in Figure 4. In this example, the patient has three personal rules 
concerning smoking, exercising, and fastening seatbelt. By using a principle of foresight, the patient adopts a general, top-down, strategy giving priority to the future and thus 
bunching different therapeutic tasks, also including taking medicine, following diet etc. Note that the principle of foresight may also represent the driving force, which leads the 
patient to adopt individual bundling tactics (dotted lines). (Modiﬁ  ed with permission from Reach 2007).Patient Preferences and Adherence 2008:2 17
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Conclusion: from statistical models 
to a causal theory of adherence, 
a change of paradigm
Nevertheless, this argument does not mean that these two 
accounts, psychological or philosophical, of adherence, are 
only different ways of saying the same thing. Most psychologi-
cal models quoted above can be illustrated by showing boxes 
containing mental states (for instance, a belief), connected 
by arrows to boxes containing the behavior (for instance, 
quit smoking). The arrows represent associations between 
the mental state and the behaviors that were shown to exist 
during trials conducted with a certain number of subjects. 
However, it is well known that the existence of an association, 
statistically proven for a population of subjects, does not imply 
that in a particular subject there is a real causal link between 
the mental state and the subject’s behavior. At the most, we 
can predict, according to the Health Belief Model, that if an 
individual, let’s say Jane, believes that smoking is bad for her 
health, then Jane has a better chance of quitting smoking than 
if she does not hold this belief. But such a prediction remains 
simply statistical. Thus, if one day Jane really quits smoking, 
it does not mean that she did it because of this belief. She may 
have done it for a completely different reason, for example to 
please her daughter or because the price of cigarettes went up. 
On the other hand, Jane could also continue to smoke, even 
though she believes smoking is bad for her health. These 
models have a major limitation: they cannot explain why a 
given individual is or is not adherent to medical advice. Such 
behavior remains a mystery. And when one tries to improve 
the adherence of this individual, these models may prove to be 
useless, because they do not provide a mechanistic explanation 
of nonadherence of this particular individual.
Therefore, the search for a true explanation of the concept 
of adherence meant switching from descriptions of phenomena, 
which are certainly objective but have only statistical value, 
and returning to the individual, which would be unavoidably 
subjective, but would allow us to draw conclusions applicable 
to this particular individual. This is obviously crucial in clini-
cal practice, since we do not take care of populations, but of 
patients. In other words, the investigation should no longer 
have as its object the behavior observed in a population of 
patients. It must focus on what a given patient is actually doing 
and for what reasons. Thus, the aim of this paper was to show 
that this investigation can no longer belong only to the ﬁ  eld 
of psychology, but must move to philosophy.
Philosophical analysis is the only way to get close 
to the mechanisms of adherence. Using a philosophical, 
rather than a psychological, framework makes this possible, 
because philosophers, or at least some of them, admit that 
mental states are causally efﬁ  cient. According to Jaegwon 
Kim,
“The possibility of human agency, and hence our moral 
practice, evidently requires that our mental states have causal 
effects in the physical world […] A science that invokes 
mental phenomena in its explanation is presumptively 
committed to their causal efﬁ  cacy; if a phenomenon is to 
have an explanatory role, its presence or absence must make 
a difference, a causal difference” (Kim 2005).
Therefore, the philosophy of mind can provide a way to 
explain how some mental states, for instance a belief, cause 
the observed behavior of a given individual, in the same 
sense that insulin causes hypoglycemia in a given patient, and 
not only as a statistical phenomenon observed in a popula-
tion of subjects. This paper attempts to apply the concept of 
mental causation, described in the philosophy of mind, to 
the medical issue of adherence, and may provide the change 
of paradigm necessary to reach a real understanding of the 
mechanism of nonadherence to long term therapies, and to 
resolve this crucial problem in contemporary medicine.
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